A Response to the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on the Western Balkans

Context of the Hearing and Scope of This Response

On December 2, 2025, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee – Subcommittee on Europe convened a hearing titled “Flashpoint: A Path Toward Stability in the Western Balkans”. The hearing was chaired by Keith Self, who currently serves as Chair of the Subcommittee on Europe. Testimony was provided by three witnesses: Max Primorac, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation; Luke Coffey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute; and Edward P. Joseph, Lecturer and Senior Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS.

The hearing focused broadly on regional stability in the Western Balkans, with particular emphasis on Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian and Chinese influence, and U.S. strategic interests in Southeastern Europe. Several assertions advanced during the discussion framed Serbia as a primary driver of instability and as a persistent enabler of malign external influence.

This response is intended exclusively as a foreign policy–focused analytical rebuttal to those claims. It does not address Serbia’s internal political dynamics, governance debates, or domestic policy questions. Rather, it engages strictly with the external orientation of Serbian policy, regional security dynamics, compliance with international agreements, and the empirical alignment of Serbia’s economic, energy, and defense posture with U.S. and Euro-Atlantic interests. The objective is to clarify the factual record, challenge misleading narratives where they arise, and contribute to a more balanced and evidence-based understanding of Serbia’s role in the Western Balkans within the context of U.S. foreign policy deliberations.

The Pupin Initiative welcomes the continued attention of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee on Europe to developments in the Western Balkans. Open hearings and public discussion play an important role in shaping informed U.S. foreign policy, particularly in a region marked by complex historical and political dynamics.

In that spirit, this response is offered as a constructive contribution aimed at enriching the discussion with additional context and empirical perspective. We hope that future deliberations will reflect a broader range of regional viewpoints, and we remain fully available to support ongoing dialogue through research, analysis, and expert engagement in the interest of regional stability and stronger U.S.–Western Balkans relations.

Reassessing Serbia’s Role in Regional Stability

Claims advanced during the hearing that the Western Balkans “will not stabilize until Serbia’s normalization” rest on an overly unilateral reading of regional dynamics. Stability in the Western Balkans is a multilateral outcome, shaped by unresolved institutional arrangements, credibility gaps in international mediation, and asymmetrical enforcement of agreements. Serbia has implemented or partially implemented almost every agreed obligation (around 80 %) under the Brussels Dialogue, including the dissolution of Serbian security structures in northern Kosovo and the integration of police and judiciary systems. At the same time, the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM), an EU-endorsed and legally binding obligation, remains unimplemented by Priština more than a decade later, highlighting a structural imbalance in enforcement that undermines trust and incentives for further concessions. Framing Serbia as the sole or primary obstacle simply does not correspond to the situation on the ground.

There is an ethical responsibility to demystify the situation and to present verifiable, fact-based information. Unsubstantiated claims raised during this hearing risk obscuring the reality of Serbia’s significant progress in strengthening regional stability and fostering constructive relations with the international community.

Serbia’s Foreign Policy Orientation: Evidence Over Assumptions

Assertions that Serbia remains “firmly in Russia’s orbit” are not borne out by empirical indicators. Economically, over 65 percent of Serbia’s trade is conducted with the European Union, while more than 70 percent of total FDI stock originates from EU member states. Specifically, U.S. companies are among the fastest-growing investors in Serbia’s ICT, energy services, and manufacturing sectors. In energy policy, Serbia has accelerated diversification through Bulgaria and Greece, including access to the Alexandroupolis LNG terminal, with strategic documents explicitly prioritizing the reduction of single-supplier dependency in line with EU and U.S. energy security objectives.

In the security domain, Serbia conducted more joint military exercises with NATO members (44 only with the U.S.) than with Russia (6) in 2017 (with the continuation of the trend in the future), participates actively in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (23 drills), and maintains defense cooperation agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany. Serbia has maintained a ban on military exercises since the start of the war in Ukraine, lifting it only to participate in “the Platinum Wolf 2023”, “Platinum Wolf 2024,” and “Platinum Wolf 2025” exercises, co-organised by the United States. Also, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Serbia has not conducted a single joint military exercise with Russia, while sustaining robust cooperation with NATO partners.

Moreover, Serbia’s material behavior since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine further complicates claims of firm alignment with Moscow. According to reporting by the Financial Times, Serbian-produced ammunition has been exported via third countries and ultimately supplied to Ukraine, with estimates indicating that more than €800 million worth of Serbian artillery shells and ammunition have reached Ukrainian forces since 2022—a scale of indirect contribution difficult to reconcile with narratives of strategic loyalty to Russia. This pattern is reinforced by defense-industrial choices that signal long-term orientation: in 2024, Serbia made a political commitment to procure French Rafale multirole fighter jets, followed in 2025 by a decision to expand cooperation with Israel through the acquisition of Hermes 900 unmanned aerial systems and artillery-support drone capabilities from Elbit Systems. Together, these decisions structurally anchor Serbia’s force modernization, training, and sustainment within Western and EU defense ecosystems rather than Russian platforms.

Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina: Legal Disputes

The portrayal of the Republic of Srpska as a Kremlin-controlled proxy that has constructed “parallel institutions” mischaracterizes the nature of political contestation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The core dispute has centered on the legitimacy and scope of authority of the High Representative, particularly the use of powers without UN Security Council confirmation, rather than the establishment of extra-constitutional governance structures. While tensions have escalated episodically, authorities in the Republic of Srpska have ultimately pursued institutional de-escalation, including appeals to courts, engagement with existing legal mechanisms, and the organization of elections in line with established procedures. The removal of Milorad Dodik from office by judicial authorities, regardless of political interpretation, further underscores that institutional processes, not unilateral secessionist actions, remain the primary arena of dispute.

Recent developments also suggest a recalibration in the U.S. approach toward the Republic of Srpska, with greater emphasis on engagement alongside pressure. The lifting of U.S. sanctions on Milorad Dodik, combined with high-level meetings between U.S. officials and Republika Srpska representatives, including Željka Cvijanović, indicates recognition that durable stability requires dialogue with all constitutionally relevant actors. At the same time, U.S. support for regional energy initiatives such as the Southern Gas Interconnection underscores a shift toward prioritizing energy security and economic resilience. Framing constitutional and legal disputes as evidence of “parallel-state construction” risks obscuring the unresolved ambiguities embedded in the Dayton Peace Agreement and may ultimately hinder, rather than advance, institutional stabilization.

Relations with Neighbors: Regional Integration Over Destabilization

Claims that Serbia actively stokes instability among its neighbors are insufficiently supported by evidence. Serbia fully recognizes Montenegro’s sovereignty, supports it on the EU path, maintains full diplomatic relations, and remains Montenegro’s largest trading partner. Existing bilateral frictions are largely identity-political and internal rather than the product of Serbian state destabilization. More broadly, Serbia is a committed participant in regional cooperation frameworks (all backed by the EU and the U.S.), including the Berlin Process, Open Balkan, and CEFTA, positioning itself as a regional economic anchor rather than a spoiler. These mechanisms contribute to labor mobility, trade facilitation, and economic interdependence, key stabilizing factors in a region facing demographic decline and economic outmigration.

By contrast, the Belgrade–Priština track presents a markedly more acute challenge, yet this hearing frames responsibility for instability almost exclusively on Belgrade, an attribution that is not borne out by observable political signals. Priština, especially under Albin Kurti, has repeatedly acted as a non-constructive actor, evidenced by the suspension of the US-facilitated strategic dialogue, explicit characterizations of Kurti as obstructive even during this hearing, and sustained pressure from the US Embassy for the equal and meaningful participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s political life. These signals are not ambiguous. In a process where obstruction is clearly identified, pressure follows the obstructing party. The fact that such pressure has been directed toward Priština, rather than Belgrade, strongly indicates where responsibility for stalled normalization lies, and undermines claims that Serbia is the primary destabilizing actor in this bilateral relationship.

Military Neutrality and NATO’s Southern Flank

Serbia’s policy of military neutrality has contributed to predictability rather than disruption along NATO’s southern periphery. Serbia hosts no foreign military bases, does not challenge NATO borders, and cooperates closely with NATO partners on migration management, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance. Despite repeated political and security crises, Serbia has consistently avoided militarized escalation. Taken together with its operational cooperation with NATO member states and the absence of joint military activity with Russia since 2022, Serbia’s defense posture positions it as a net stabilizing actor, not a spoiler, in the regional security environment.

Demystifying China’s Role in Serbia

Corruption remains Serbia’s most serious structural vulnerability and the foremost concern of its citizens, as reflected in polling cited during the hearing, making transparency and accountability central to long-term stability. Certain Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, particularly those negotiated through non-transparent, state-to-state arrangements, have exposed governance risks and justifiably drawn public and international scrutiny. These projects, often characterized by limited competitive tendering, restricted public access to contracts, and weak oversight mechanisms, illustrate how opaque financing models can magnify existing institutional weaknesses. However, it is analytically inaccurate to portray China as embedded across Serbia’s strategic sectors in 2025. Chinese engagement in Serbia remains largely confined to construction and heavy industry, while critical infrastructure, energy diversification (with the exception of NIS at this moment, but with taken measures), telecommunications, cybersecurity, and advanced technologies are dominated or on the path to be so by EU and U.S. frameworks, standards, and financing institutions. Serbia has not adopted Chinese digital governance models, nor has China obtained control over security-sensitive systems.

Battling Unverified Claims in the Hearing

“Serbia's unresolved relationship with Kosovo is one of the core drivers of regional instability that has created a strategic fault line that enables Russia's ability to undermine the EU and NATO's ability to empower the Balkan countries.”

Labeling Serbia’s relationship with Kosovo as the main source of regional instability is a one-sided narrative that unfairly places blame on Belgrade while overlooking shared responsibilities and complex regional dynamics. Russia’s support for Serbia’s territorial integrity primarily serves to maintain favorable public opinion and limited influence within Serbia. But Serbia is distancing itself from Russian influence, now mostly confined to the energy sector through Gazprom’s stake in NIS, where Belgrade seeks a solution but faces resistance from the Russian side to sell its share.

“Neighboring Kosovo, on the other hand, has in place specific protections for minorities that exceed those of its EU counterparts.”

Although Kosovo’s constitution provides legal protections for minority rights, the 2024 Civil Society Report on Human Rights in Kosovo documents that non-majority communities, including ethnic Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians, continue to face significant practical challenges in the realization of their rights. The report highlights instances where constitutional and legal guarantees are not consistently enforced in practice, such as unequal access to justice, insufficient availability of information and services in minority languages, and obstacles in political and public service participation for minority representatives. These findings demonstrate that, despite formal safeguards, actual enforcement and inclusion remain unresolved issues for minorities across Kosovo. ”Kosovo fears Serbian leverage in the association of Serb-majority municipalities, so-called ASM, and has not fully implemented ASM policies.” While Priština often says it fears Serbian leverage through the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) and uses this as a reason for slow or partial implementation, this obligation is legally binding and was accepted by Kosovo’s authorities as part of the 2013 Brussels Agreement. Including Serbs as equal and meaningful participants in Priština’s political and social processes increases trust between communities and helps break down dangerous stereotypes that portray them as having a malign influence.

“Whereas Serbia,…, reportedly hosted Russian operatives training paramilitary groups in eastern Serbia to disrupt Moldova's 2024 and 2025 elections.” The Balkan Insight investigation relies on intelligence claims and journalistic reconstruction but does not establish verified evidence of Serbian state involvement, authorization, or institutional support for the alleged training activities. The article itself acknowledges that the reported camps were covert, informal, and operated by Russian-linked actors, without demonstrating control, awareness, or complicity by Serbian authorities. No official findings from Serbian, EU, NATO, or OSCE institutions are cited confirming that Serbia hosted or facilitated election-disruption operations targeting Moldova. Moreover, Serbian security services arrested Russian intelligence operatives on Serbian territory during the summer and detained individuals connected to these camps, which further undermines claims of state sponsorship or tacit approval. As such, extrapolating these allegations into assertions of Serbian state responsibility or strategic alignment constitutes an analytical overreach not supported by the source itself.

“Serbia remains Russia's enabler and serves as Moscow's primary foothold in the region. While Serbia occasionally signals a balanced foreign policy approach, the reality is that Belgrade remains firmly in Russia's orbit. This will not change any time soon, no matter how much we would like it to.”

Russian influence in Serbia is largely confined to the energy sector, primarily through the National Oil Industry (NIS), while favorable public opinion toward Russia reflects historical and societal attitudes rather than institutional or strategic state policy. Serbia’s core security, regulatory, and economic frameworks are aligned with European and US standards, indicating that public sentiment does not translate into government decision-making. Importantly, the NIS ownership issue is likely to be resolved in the near term, with a high probability of Russian divestment, which would mark a decisive break from Russia’s last significant leverage point and a clear strategic inflection benefiting US interests.

”Because Belgrade does not want Montenegro to join the European Union.”

There is no credible evidence that Belgrade opposes Montenegro’s EU accession. On the contrary, Serbian officials have publicly expressed support for Montenegro’s European path and broader Western Balkans enlargement. Serbia has no institutional leverage to block another country’s accession, which is determined by Montenegro’s own reforms and EU member states’ consensus, not Serbian preferences.

Strategic Takeaway for U.S. Policymakers

The framing of Serbia as the central destabilizing actor in the Western Balkans is analytically weak and strategically counterproductive. It risks undermining reform incentives, reinforcing zero-sum narratives, and creating self-fulfilling alignment failures. A more effective U.S. approach recognizes Serbia as the largest economy in the Western Balkans, a necessary partner for energy diversification, transport corridors, and security cooperation, and a state whose long-term trajectory depends on credible integration pathways and balanced enforcement of agreements rather than public attribution of blame. In this context, Washington’s announced intention to open a strategic dialogue with Serbia signals a recognition that sustained engagement, rather than pressure alone, is essential for anchoring Serbia within a cooperative regional and transatlantic framework. Stability will not emerge from pressuring Serbia in isolation, but from consistent, structured engagement that treats Serbia as a strategic stakeholder rather than a conditional problem.