Milan Tomović, Đorđe Ubiparip, Nikola Dugandžija, Đorđe Gagić, Lidija Zečević

Developing Serbia's Capital Market: How U.S. Financial Expertise and Investment Can Support Economic Modernization

How U.S. financial expertise and development finance can deepen Serbia’s capital market, curb reliance on opaque financing?

Capital Markets as Strategic Infrastructure

As Washington recalibrates its European strategy around commercial ties, connectivity, and burden-sharing, the depth and transparency of a partner’s financial system has become a measure of strategic reliability. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy is explicit about the instruments it favors in this part of Europe.

“Our broad policy for Europe should prioritize building up the healthy nations of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, through commercial ties, weapons sales, political collaboration, and cultural and educational exchanges.”  — National Security Strategy 2025, p. 27

Serbia, the largest economy in the Western Balkans, remains overwhelmingly financed by bank lending. That dependence leaves the private sector exposed to credit cycles and reliant on capital pools whose terms are frequently opaque and non-Western. A deep, rule-bound capital market is the infrastructure on which resilient modern economies are built — and it is increasingly the price of admission to the Euro-Atlantic financial mainstream.

The moment is opportune. In November 2025, Euronext acquired the Athens Stock Exchange (ATHEX), which since 2021 has held a 10.24% stake in the Belgrade Stock Exchange (BELEX) and runs the Serbian market’s trading platform. Belgrade is therefore now technologically tethered, through Athens, to a pan-European pool of roughly 1,800 listed issuers and some €7 trillion in market capitalization. With the announced US–Serbia Strategic Dialogue providing a bilateral framework, Serbia has a rare opening to build the transparent market architecture that both EU accession and American investment require — with U.S. institutional support rather than legacy dependencies.

This analysis proceeds in four stages. Part II measures Serbia’s capital-market gap against regional peers. Part III identifies the specific comparative advantages of U.S. institutional expertise. Part IV proposes a phased U.S.–Serbia Financial Cooperation Framework. Part V offers actionable recommendations and their strategic implications.

The Capital-Market Gap in Serbia

Serbia’s market is shallow by every measure. The U.S. State Department’s 2025 Investment Climate Statement judges Serbia’s equity and bond markets underdeveloped: of 248 companies listed on BELEX, fewer than 100 trade more than once a week. Market capitalization has hovered under 10% of GDP in recent years — against a world average near 57% and regional peers several times higher.

Table 1. Key capital-market indicators, most recent available year. Sources: World Bank (market capitalization to GDP); Invest Europe (private-equity investment). Figures are indicative.

The deeper problem is structural. Bank lending remains the overwhelming source of corporate funding, and the domestic institutional base that would anchor equity demand is thin: a World Bank technical note put the combined assets of Serbia’s mutual funds and voluntary pension funds at under 1.5% of GDP, a fraction of the Central and Eastern European norm. Serbia operates no mandatory funded pension pillar — the mechanism that, in peers such as Poland, generated durable institutional demand for domestic equities — and minority-shareholder protections remain less developed than in most EU member states.

There are, encouragingly, early signs of maturation. In January 2024 Serbia launched a World Bank–supported Corporate Bonds Issuance Program, and in April 2025 Elixir Group placed the first corporate bond directly on the exchange’s organized market in thirteen years. These are green shoots on thin soil.

The cost of the gap is best seen by comparison. In 2010, Serbia and Romania recorded near-identical market-capitalization ratios. Bucharest then pursued a decade of regulatory and institutional reform and reached roughly 14% of GDP; Belgrade stagnated below 10%. Had Serbia matched Romania’s trajectory, the Fellows’ illustrative counterfactual implies market capitalization on the order of $6 billion higher than today’s level — capital that domestic firms could have raised for expansion, and that was instead never mobilized.

This is not merely an economic shortfall; it is a strategic vacuum. A shallow market pushes Serbian firms and the state toward whatever financing is available, including opaque, non-Western credit whose conditions can carry political strings. Filling that gap with transparent, rule-bound, Western-anchored infrastructure is precisely where U.S. institutional capacity converges with Serbia’s national interest — and with Washington’s stated aim of building up the healthy economies of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe.

The U.S. Comparative Advantage

Foreign investors withhold capital when the governance, disclosure, and enforcement architecture needed to price risk accurately is absent. Serbia’s deficit is, at root, one of institutional credibility — and this is precisely what the United States has spent decades building and is equipped to transfer. What distinguishes the American offering from the EU’s accession-driven harmonization is that it pairs market-tested institutional models with a deliberate strategic interest in keeping the Western Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic orbit, and can begin delivering capacity without waiting on years of legislative transposition. Four channels stand out.

Market regulation

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Technical Assistance Program shares expertise with foreign regulators across enforcement, supervision, and disclosure — insider trading, market manipulation, corporate governance, and anti-money-laundering among them — including through its annual International Institute for Securities Market Growth and Development. For Serbia’s Securities Commission, which lacks investigative depth and enforcement personnel, this is the most direct available channel for institutional upgrading.

Corporate governance

Well-governed companies attract capital because they can be priced with confidence. The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2023) — widely reflected in U.S. practice and used as the basis for World Bank governance assessments — emphasize independent boards, transparent reporting, and effective oversight. American institutional funds will not deploy at scale where board independence and disclosure cannot be verified, which makes governance reform the precondition for unlocking U.S. capital specifically.

Pension development

U.S. public pension funds hold more than $6 trillion in assets, among the largest pools of institutional capital anywhere. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) — built on fiduciary duty, prudent-investor rules, and mandatory disclosure — offers a proven legislative template for the funded pension pillar Serbia lacks, and with it the domestic demand needed to sustain market depth independent of volatile foreign flows.

Development finance

The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) opened its first-ever permanent overseas office in Belgrade in 2020, following the Washington normalization agreement, and a bilateral investment-promotion agreement provides the legal basis for its full toolkit: debt, equity, guarantees, political-risk insurance, and technical assistance. DFC investment is not a substitute for EU accession but an accelerant that anchors Serbia’s market reform within a transatlantic trajectory.

The through-line is simple. The United States does not merely offer Serbia capital — it offers the institutional architecture that makes capital trustworthy, calibrated to the standards EU accession requires but has been slow to deliver.

A U.S.–Serbia Financial Cooperation Framework

Serbia’s over-reliance on bank lending constrains long-term capital for small and medium-sized enterprises and leaves the economy exposed to external shocks; deepening the capital market is therefore a macroeconomic priority, not a technical one. The following framework sequences U.S. engagement across four mechanisms.

Mechanism I — Regulatory assistance and capacity-building

Trust must precede capital. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance can partner with the Ministry of Finance to develop the domestic sovereign-debt market, strengthen anti-money-laundering frameworks, and improve tax administration, while the SEC’s Technical Assistance Program trains the Securities Commission to detect market abuse and protect minority shareholders — building on Serbia’s completed, EU-aligned securities legislation.

Mechanism II — Deploying U.S. development finance

With the regulatory foundation in place, the DFC can safely scale market activity. Building on the loan-portfolio guarantees it has already extended through Serbian banks — ProCredit, Addiko, Banca Intesa, and Raiffeisen — which catalyzed up to $272 million for SMEs, the DFC should expand partial credit guarantees to de-risk lending to micro-enterprises, startups, and agricultural households, and syndicate with the European Investment Bank and others to finance digital and green infrastructure while providing the credit enhancements that support future bond issuance.

Mechanism III — Catalyzing private equity and venture capital

With credit de-risked, the priority becomes a risk-capital ecosystem for the family-owned firms that lack succession or growth capital. To anchor this asset class, the United States should establish a congressionally authorized Western Balkans Enterprise Fund, modeled on the SEED Act Enterprise Funds that seeded private-sector development in Poland ($240 million) and Hungary ($60 million) after 1989. Acting as a regional anchor investor alongside existing USAID-seeded and EIB-backed vehicles, such a fund would drive corporate-governance reform and prepare local companies for eventual BELEX listings.

Mechanism IV — Sector-specific innovation

Finally, cooperation should target Serbia’s competitive sectors. In agriculture, the EU-recognized BioSense Institute in Novi Sad — a European Centre of Excellence for agritech — anchors a fast-growing cluster that dedicated funding windows and “smart” BELEX listings for high-growth firms could help scale. U.S. technical support can likewise help structure a streamlined framework for sovereign and corporate green bonds, unlocking international ESG capital for Serbia’s sustainable transition.

Sequenced this way — regulatory harmonization first, then targeted capital mobilization, then deeper regional integration — the framework can re-engineer the financial architecture of the Western Balkans and knit it into transatlantic networks.

Recommendations and Strategic Implications

The following phased recommendations translate the framework into action for Serbian policymakers, in close coordination with American partners.

  1. Consolidate market trust first. Empower the Securities Commission of Serbia — staffing, enforcement, and investigative tools — across investor protection, market-abuse control, fund regulation, and disclosure, drawing on the SEC Technical Assistance Program and Treasury OTA. Prioritize substance over announcement.

  2. Deepen both sides of the market. On the demand side, guide pension, insurance, and investment funds to expand participation within prudent risk limits, and legislate a funded pension pillar on ERISA-style fiduciary lines. On the supply side, list a small number of high-quality, well-governed firms — quality over volume — to build confidence through visible success stories.

  3. Scale U.S. development finance. Expand DFC guarantees for micro-enterprises, startups, and agriculture; syndicate with the EIB on infrastructure; and use sovereign credit enhancements to support Serbia’s first wave of corporate and green-bond issuance.

  4. Establish a Western Balkans Enterprise Fund. Seek congressional authorization for a regional anchor fund on the SEED Act model to catalyze private equity, drive corporate governance, and build an IPO pipeline for the Belgrade exchange.

  5. Improve access without lowering standards. Simplify issuance, cut unnecessary costs, clarify investor tax rules, and resolve technical frictions such as dormant securities accounts — while tightening disclosure and minority-shareholder protections in line with the G20/OECD Principles.

  6. Institutionalize U.S.–Serbia financial cooperation. Fold securities regulation, pension development, corporate governance, and market infrastructure into the announced Strategic Dialogue, with working groups, benchmarks, and a monitoring mechanism — reinforcing, not replacing, Serbia’s EU alignment.

© 2026 Pupin Initiative. All rights reserved.

The Pupin Initiative is an independent, non-partisan 501(c)(3) research organization. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

1717-1 N St NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA

© 2026 Pupin Initiative. All rights reserved.

The Pupin Initiative is an independent, non-partisan 501(c)(3) research organization. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

1717-1 N St NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA